University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Publicity & News Clippings

Judicial Ethics and the National News Council

1972

David Gerbard and Sidney Parnas v. United States
Supreme Court Reporter

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/publicity
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Supreme Court Reporter, David Gerbard and Sidney Parnas v. United States (1972).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/publicity/81

This News Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Judicial Ethics and the National News Council at UC Hastings Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publicity & News Clippings by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

GELBARD v. UNITED STATES
Cite a s 92 S.Ct. 2357 (1972)

2357

such as Near v. Minnesota ex reI. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357
(1931), are-precisely comparable to this
case, in which a typical sanction imposed
was the requirement that the group
abandon its plan to meet in the college
coffee shop.

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, 443 F.2d 837, affirmed an adjudication of contempt. In No. 71-263,
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, 450 F.2d 199 and 450
F.2d 231, reversed adjudications of contempt, and certiorari was granted. The
Prior cases dealing with First Amend- Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan,
ment rights are not fungible goods, and held that grand jury witnesses were enI think the doctrine of these cases sug- titled to invoke statutory prohibition
gests two important distinctions. The against use before gran~ jury of evigovernment as employer or school ad- . dence derived from interception of any
ministrator may impose upon employees wire or oral communication as defense·
and students reasonable regulations that to charges of civil contempt brought on
would be impermissible if imposed by the basis of their refusal to obey court
the government upon all citizens. And orders to testify before grand jury.
there can be a constitutional distinction
No. 71-110 reversed and remanded;
between the infliction of criminal pun- No. 71-263 affirmed.
ishment, on the one hand, and the impoMr. Justice Douglas concurred and
sition of milder administrative or disci- filed opinion.
plinary sanctions, on the other, even
Mr. Justice White concurred and
though the same First Amen"iiment infiled opinion.
terest is implicated by each.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented and
Because some of the language used by
filed
opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice
the Court tends to obscure these distinctions, which I believe to be important, I Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun and
Mr. Justice Powell joined.
concur only in the judgment.
1. Grand Jury e=>36

David GELBARD and Sidney Pamas,
Petitioners,

v.
lJNITED STATES.
UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v.
Jogues EGAN and Anne 'Elizabeth
Walsh.
Nos. 71-110, 71-263.
Argued March 2:7, 1972.

Decided June 26, 1972.
Civil contempt proceedings against
witnesses before federal grand juries
who refused to comply with cou,rt orders
to testify. In No. 71-110, the United

Grand jury witnesses were entitled
to invoke statutory prohibition against
use before grand jury of evidence derived from interception of any wire or
oral communication as defense to charge
of civil contempt brought on the basis
of their refusal to obey court orders to
testify before grand jury. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2515; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a).
2. Grand Jury e=>36

A showing by witness before grand
jury that interrogation which he refuses
to answer would be based upon illegal
interception of the witness' communications constitutes "just cause" for refusing to comply with an order .of the court
to testify before grand jury and precludes finding of contempt for such refusal to testify. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515;
28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a).
See publication Words, and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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3. Criminal Law <€;:::>394.3
Grand Jury <€;:::>36

Statute providing that, whenever
any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communic~tion and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any proceeding before court,
grand jury or other specified governmental body serves not only to protect
the privacy of communications, but also
to insure that the courts do .not become
partners to illegal conduct. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2515.
4. Grand Jury <€;:::>36

Grand jury witness is not required
to enforce the statutory prohibition
against use before grand jury of intercepted communications or evidence derived therefrom by motion to suppress'
suppression motions, as method of e forcing the statutory prohibition, m t
be made in accordance with the rest ictions upon forums, procedures, and
grounds specified by statute aut orizing any aggrieved person in sp ified
types of proceedings to move to s
the contents of any intercepted ire or
oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 25 0, 2510
(11),2515,2518(10) (a); 28 .S.C.A. §
1826(a).

just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify," the witness
may invoke as a defense 18 U.S.C. §
515, which directs that "[ w ] henever
a y wire
oral communication has been
in rcepte , no part of the contents of
suc com unication and no evidence derive th refrom may be received in eviproceeding in or
dence i any
before
grand jury
. ,"
since
showing that the interrogation
woul b based upon the illegal interception of the witness' communications
that
Pp.

ot

110, 443 F.2d 837, reversed
; No. 71-263, 450 F.2d 199
31, affirmed.

for petitioners
Parnas.

'gar, San Francisco, Cal.,
avid Gelbard and Sidney

Daniel M. Fri dman, Washington, D.
C., for the Unite States.
Jack J. Levine, Philadelphia, Pa., for
Joseph Egan and Anne Elizabeth Walsh
pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Syllabus *

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the
opinion of the Court.

Where a grand jury witness is adjudicated in civil contempt under 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a) for refusing "without

These cases present challenges to the
validity of adjudications of civil contempt, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a),l

t

1

* The

syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United · States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287,
50 L.Ed. 499.

I.

Section 1826 (a) provides:
" 'Vhenever a witness in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand
jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an
order of the court to testify or provide
other information, including any book,
paper, document, · record, recordin~ or
other material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly

brought to its attention, may summarily
order his confinement at a suitable place
until such time as the witness is willing
to give such testimony or provide such
information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of"(1) the court proceeding, or
"(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months."
This provision was enacted as part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. It
was intended to codify the existing practice of the federal courts. S.Rep.No.
91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 33, 56-57,
148-149 (1969); H.R.Rep.No.91-1549,

I
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of witnesses before federal grand juries
who refused to comply with court orders
to testify. The refusals were defended
upon the ground that interrogation was
to be based upon information obtained
from the witnesses' communications, allegedly intercepted by federal agents by
means of illegal wiretapping and elec- .
tronic surveillance. A provision of Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211,
as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, directs that H[w]henever any wire or oral
communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any .
proceeding in or before any
grand jury, .
. if the disclosure of
that information would be in violation
of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 2
The question presented is whether grand
jury witnesses, in proceedings under 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a), are entitled to invoke
this prohibition of § 2515 as a defense to
contempt charges brought against them
for refusing to testify. In No. 71-110,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that they are not entitled to do
so. United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d
837 (1971). In No. 71-263, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, en
bane, reached the cOI.1trary conclusion.
In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (1971); In
re Walsh, 450 F.2d 231 (1971). We
granted certiorari. 404 U.S. 990, 92

S.Ct. 531, 30 L.Ed.2d 541 (1971).3 We
d.isagree with the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and agree with the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

91st Cong., 2d Sess., 33, 46 (1970), U.S.
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 4007; see
Shillitani V. United States, 384 U.S. 364,
86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966).

bane) . The District of Columbia Circuit
has aligned itself with the Third, see In
re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (1971), while
the Xinth has continued to follow Gelbard,
see Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667
(1971); Olsen v. United States, 446 F.2d
912 (1971); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369
(1971); Reed V . United States, 448 F.2d
1276 (1971); United States v. Reynolds,
449 F.2d 1347 (1971). The First and
Fifth Circuits have also adverted to the
question. In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466 (CAl
1971); In re Popkin, F.2d (1972); Dudley v. United States, 427
F.2d 1140 (CA5 1970). See also United
States ex reI. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d
139 (CA2 1968); Carter v. United States,
417 F.2d 384 (CA91969).

2. Section 2515 provides in full :
"'Vhenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no
evidence derived thereform may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or
other authority of the United States; a
State, or a political subdivision thereof if
the disclosure of that informa~ion would
be in violation of this chapter."
3. The Third Circuit followed Egan in In
re Maratea, 444 F.2d 499 (1971) (en

No. 71-110. A federal district judge
approved wiretaps by federal agents of
the telephones of Perry Paul, an alleged
bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, 'a former executive of a Las Vegas casino. In
the course of those taps, the agents overheard conversations between Paul and
petitioner Gelbard and between Zarowitz
and petitioner Parnas. Petitioners were
subsequently called before a federal
grand jury convened in Los Angeles to
investigate possible violations of federal
gambling laws. The Government as-.
serted that petitioners would be questioned about third parties and that the
questions would be based upon petitioners' intercepted telephone conversations.
Petitioners appeared before the grand
jury, but declined to answer any questions based upon their intercepted conversations until they were afforded an
opportunity to challenge the legality of
the interceptions. Following a hearing,
the United States District Court for the
Central District of C~lifornia found petitioners in contempt and, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a), committed them to custody for the life of the grand jury or
until they answered the questions.
No. 71-263. Respondents Egan and
Walsh were called before a federal grand
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jury convened in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to investigate, among other possible crimes, an alleged plot to kidnap ,a
Government official. Pursuant to 18
U .S.C. § 2514, both respondents were
granted transactional ir:nmunity in return for their testimony. Respondents
appeared before the grand jury, but refused to answer questions on the ground,
among others, that the questions were
based upon information overheard from
respondents by means of the Government's illegal wIretapping and electronic
surveillance. The Government did not
reply to respondents' allegations.4 Following a hearing, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania found respondents in contempt, and they we'r e also committed to
custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (a) .
Section 1826(a) expressly limits the
adjudication of civil contempt to the
case of a grand jury witness who "refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify."
Our inquiry, then, is whether a showing
that interrogation would be based upon
the illegal interception of the witness's
communications constitutes a showing of
"just cause" that precludes a finding
of contempt. The answer turns on the
construction of Title III of the Omnibus
Act.5
I

In Title III, Congress enacted a compreh,e nsive scheme for the regulation of
wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
See United States v. United States , District Court, 405 U.S. - , at - - -,
92 S.Ct. - , at - - - , 32 L.Ed.2d
- . Title III authorizes the interception of private wire and oral communications, but only when law enforcement
officials are investigating specified serious crimes and receive prior judicial
approval, an approval that may not be
given except upon compliance with strin4. See n. 23, infra.
5. In view of our disposition of these cases, we do not reach any of the constitutional
issues tendered as to the right of a grand

\,

gent conditions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516,
2518(1)-(8). If a wire or oral communication is intercepted in accordance
with the provisions of Title III, the contents of the communication may be disclosed and used under certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 2517. Except as
expressly authorized in Title III, however, all interceptions of wire and oral
communications are flatly prohibited.
Unauthorized interceptions and the disclosure or use of information obtained
through unauthorized interceptions are
crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 ( 1), and the victim of such interception, disclosure, or
use is entitled to recover civil damageS,
18 U.S.C. § 2520. Title III also bars the
use as evidence before official bodies of
the contents and fruits of illegal interceptions, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and provides
procedures for moving to suppress such
evidence in various proceedings, 18 U.S.
C. § 2518(9 )-(10) .
The witnesses in these cases were held,
in contempt for disobeying court orders
by refusing to produce evidence--their
testimony-before grand juries. Consequently, their primar y contention is that
§ 2515, the evidentiary prohibition of Title III, afforded them a defense to the.
contempt charges. In addressing that
contention, we must assume, in the present posture of these cases, that the Government has intercepted communications
of the witnesses and that the testimony
the Government seeks from them would
be, within the meaning of § 2515, "evidence derived" from the intercepted communications. We must also assume that
the communications were not intercepted
in accordance with the specified procedures and thus that the witnesses' potential testimony would be "disclosure" in
violation of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. §§
2511 ( 1), 2517 (3). In short, we proceed
on the premise that § 2515 prohibits the
presentation to grand juries of the compelled testimony of these witnesses.
jury witness to rely upon the Fourth
Amendment as a basis for refu sing to answer questions. We also note that the
constitutionality of Title III is not challenged in t hese cases.

J

GELBARD v. UNITED STATES
Cite as 92 S.Ct. 23.')7 (1972)

[1,2] The narrow question, then, is
whether under these circumstances the
witnes~es may invoke the prohibition of
§ 2515 as a defense to contemp,t charges
brought on the basis of their refusal to
obey court orqers to testify. We think
they may.
The unequivocal language of · § 2515
expresses the fundamental policy adopted by Congress on the subject of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. As
the congressional findings for Title III
make plain, that policy is strictly to limit the employment of those techniques
of acquiring information:
"To safeguard the privacy of innocent
persons, the interception of wire or
oral c~mmunications where none of the
parties to the communication has consented to the interception should he
allowed only when authorized by a
court of competent jurisdiction and
should remain under the control and
supervision of the authorizing court.
Interception of wire and oral communications should further be limited to
certain types of offenses and specific
categories of crime with assurances
that the interception is justified- and
that the information obtained thereby
will not be misused." § 801(d), 82
Stat. 211.8
6. " Paragraph (d ). recognizes the responsible
part that the judiciar.y must play in supervising the interception of wire or oral
communications in order that the privacy
of innocent persons may be protected:
. the interception or use of "wire
or oral communications should only be
on court order. Because of the importance of privacy, such interceptions should
further be limited to major offenses and
care must be taken to 'insure that no misuse is made "of any information obtained."
S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 89
(1968) U.S.CodeCong. & Admin.News,
p. 2177.
7. In stating the problem addressed by Congress in Title III, the Senate report noted
that "[bjoth proponents and opponents of
wiretapping and electronic surveillance
agree that the present state of the law
in this area is extremely unsatisfactory
92 S.Ct.-148'12
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The Senate committee report that accompanied Title III underscores the con~
gressional policy:
"Title III has as it dual purpose (1)
protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating
on a uniform basis the circumstances
and conditions under which the intercepti~n of wire and oral communications may be authorized. To assure
the privacy of oral and wi ~e communications, title III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by
persons other than duly authorized law
enforcement officers engaged in the
investigation or prevention of "specified types of serious crimes, and only
after authorization of a court order
obtained after a showing and finding
of probable cause." S.Rep.No.1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968); U.S.
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2153.
Hence, although Title III authorizes
invasions of individual privacy under
certain circumstances, the protection of
privacy was an overriding congressional
concern.'
Indeed, the congressional
findings articulate clearly the intent to
utilize the evidentiary prohibition of §
2515 to enforce the limitations imposed
"by Title III upon wiretapping and electronic surveillance:"
"In order to protect effectively the
~ privacy of wire and oral communicaand ~hat the Congress should act to clarify
the resulting confusion." S.Rep.No.1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1968), U.S.Code
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2154. The report agreed: "It would be, in short, difficult to devise a body of law from the
point of view of privacy or justice more
totally unsatisfactory "in its consequences."
Id., at 69, U.S.Code Congo & Admin.
News, p. 2156. The report then stressed
that Title III would provide the protection for privacy lacking under the prior
law:
"The need for comprehensive, fair and effective reform setting uniform standards
is obvious. New protections for privacy
must be enacted. Guidance and supervision must be given to State and Federal
law enforcement officers. This can only
be accomplished through national legislation. This the subcommittee proposes."
Ibid. (emphasis added).

2362
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tions, to 'protect the integrity of court
and administrative proceedings, and
to prevent the obstruction of interstate
commerce, it is necessary for Congress
to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under
which the interception Qf wire , and
oral communications may be author- '
ized, to prohibit any unauthorized in-terception of such communications,
and the use of the contents thereof

in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings." § 801(b), 82 Stat.
211 (emphasis added).8

. Only by striking at all aspects
of the problem can privacy be adequately protected. - The prohibition,
too, must be enforced with all appropriate sanctions. Criminal penalties
have their part to play. But other
remedies must be afforded the victim
of an unlawful invasion of privacy.
Provision must be made for civil recourse for damages. The perpetrator

must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal
proceedings. Each of these objectives
is sought by the proposed legislation."
S.Rep.No.1097, supra, at 69 U.S.Code
Congo & Admin.News, P. 2156 (emphasis added.)

And the Senate report, like the congressional findings, specifically addressed itself to the enforcement, by means of § ,
[3] Section '2515 is thus central to
2515, of the limitations upon invasions
the
legislative scheme. Its importance
of individual privacy:
as' a protection for "the victim of an un"Virtually all concede that the use lawful invasion of privacy" could not be
of wiretapping or electronic surveil- more clear.9 The purposes of § 2515 and
lance techniques by private unauthor- Title III as a whole would be subverted
ized hands has little justification were the plain command of § 2515 igwhere communications are intercept- nored when the victim of an illegal intered without the consent of one of the ception is called as a witness before a
participants. Noone quarrels with grand jury and asked questions based
the proposition that the unauthorized upon that interception. Moreover, § 2515
use 6f these techniques by law enforce- serves not .only to protect the privacy
ment agents should be prohibited. of communications,t° but also to ensure
8. "Paragraph (b) recognizea that to protect
the privacy of · wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of .c ourt and
administrative proceeding[s) and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce, it is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circumstances
and conditions under which the interception of wire or oral communications may
be authorized. It also finds that all unauthorized interception of such communications should be prohibited, as well as
the use of the contents of unauthorized
interceptions as evidence in courts and administrative hearings."
S.Rep.No.1097,
-90th Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1968) U.S.Code
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2177 (emphasis
added).
9. "Section 2515 of the new chapter imposes
an evidentiary sanction to compel compliance with the other prohibitions of the
chapter. It provides that intercepted wire
or oral communications or evidence derived therefrom may not be received in evidence in any proceeding before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency,

regulatory body, legislative committee, or
other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision of a State,
where the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter.
. [I)t is not limited to criminal
proceedings. SueD a suppression rule is
necessary and proper to protect privacy.
The provision thus forms an integral part
of the system of limitations designed to
protect privacy. Along with the criminal
and civil remedies, it should serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chap-ter will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications." S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 96 (1968) U.S.Code Congo & Admin.
News, p. 2184 (citations omitted).
10. Congressional concern with the protection of the privacy of communications is
evident- also in the specification of what
is to be protected. "The proposed legislation is intended . to protect the privacy
of the communication itself
S.Rep.No.1097; 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 90
(1968) U.S.Code Cong. & !Admfn.News
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that the courts do not become partners
the evidentiary
to illegal conduct:
prohibition was enacted also "to protect
the. integrity of court and administrative
proceedings." Consequently, to order a
grand jury witness, on pain of imprisonment, to disclose evidence that § 2515
bars ,in unequivocal terms is both to
thwart the congressional objective of
protecting individual privacy by excluding such evidence and to entangle the
courts in the illegal acts of Government
agents.

who is herself the victim of the illegal
wiretapping, to jail for refusal to participate in the exploitation of that crime
in violation of the explicit command of
Section 2515 is to stand our whole systern of criminal justice on its head."
In re Evans, 452 F .2d 1239, 1252 ( D.C.
Cir. 1871) (Wright, J., concurring).
II
Our conclusion that § 2515 is an available defense to the contempt charge finds
additional support in 18 U.S.C. § 3504,
enacted as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 935. Section 3504 is explicit confirmation that
Congress intended that grand jury witnesses, in reliance upon the prohibition
of § 2515, might refuse to answer questions based upon the illegal interception
of their communications.

In sum, ' Congress simply cannot be
understood to have sanctioned orders to
produce evidence excluded from grand
jury proceedings by § 2515. Contrary to
the Government's assertion that the ' invasion of privacy is over and done with,
to compel the testimony of these witnesses compounds the statutorily proscribed invasion of their privacy by addSection 3504 (a) (1) provides:
ing to the injury of the interception the
"In
any
proceeding in or
insult of cOplpelled disclosure. And, of
before
any
.
.
grand
jury .
course, Title III makes illegal not only
unauthorized interc~ptions but also the
"(1) Upon a claim by a party agdisclosure and use of information obtaingrieved that evidence is inadmissible
ed through such interceptions. 18 U.S.
because iUs the primary product of an
C. § 2511(1) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
unlawful act or because it was obtained
Hence, if the prohibition of § 2515 is not
by the exploitation of an unlawful act,
available as a defense to the contempt .
the opponent of the claim shall affirm
charge, disclosure through compelled tesor deny the occurrence 'of the alleged
timony makes the witness the victim,
unlawful act."
once again, of a federal crime. Finally,
recognition of § 2515 as ,a defense "re- Under § 3504(a) (2), disclosure of inlieves judges of the anomalous duty of formation relating to the claim of infinding a person in civil contempt. for admissibility is not mandatory if the
failing to cooperate w.ith the prosecutor "unlawful act" took place before June
in a course of conduct which, if pursued 19, 1968, the effective date of Title III.
unchecked, could subject the prosecutor Under § 3504(a) (3), there is a five-year
himself to heavy civil and criminal pen- limitation upon the consideration of a
alties." In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 220 claim of inadmissibility based upon "the
(CA 3 1971) (Rosenn, J., concurring) . exploitation of an unlawful act" that took
"And for a court, on petition of the exec- place before June 19, 1968. Section 3504
utive department ; to sentence a witness, (b), by reference to Title III, defines an
p. 2178. As defined in Title III, "'contents,' when used with respect to any wire
or oral communication, includes any information concer'n ing the identity of t he
parties to such communication or the
existence, substance, purport, or meaning
of that communication." 18 U.S.C. §
2510(8). The definition thus "include[s]
jill as pects of the communication itself.

No aspect , including the identity of the
parties, the substance of the communication between t hem, or the fact of the communication itself, is excluded.. The privacy of the communication to be protected i~ intended to be comprehensive.';
S.R ep.No.1097, supra, at 91, U.S.Code
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2179.

2364

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTER

"unlawful act" as one involving illegal
wiretapping or electronic sllrveil1ance.u
Section 3504, then, establishes procedures to be followed "upon a claim by a
party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because" of an illegal interception.
And § 3504 tracks § 2515 in its application to grand jury proceedings. Indeed,
H[t]he language used in defining the
types of proceedings, types of forums, and
jurisdictions in which section 3504 is applicable was taken from 18 U.S.C. §
2515." S.Rep.No.91-617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., 154 (1969) .12 In the a~plication of § 3504 to "any
proceeding in or before any
grand
.jury," ':a party aggrieved" can only be a
witness, for there is no other "party" to .
a grand jury proceeding. Moreover, a
"claim
that evidence is inadmissible" can only be a claim that the
witness's potential testimony is inadmissible. Hence, § 3504, by contemplating
"a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because" of an illegal interception, necessarily recognizes
that grand jury witnesses may rely upon
Section 3504 provides in full :
" (a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, office r, agency, regula t ory
body, or other a uthority of the United
States" (1) u pon a claim by a pa rty aggrieved
t hat evidence is inadmissible because it
is t he prima ry product of a n unl a wful
act or because it was obtained by the
exploita t ion of a n unla wful act , the
opponent of the claim shall affirm or
den y the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act ;
" (2 ) disclosu re of informa tion for a
determination if evidence is in admissible
because it is the primary product of an
unlawful act occurring prior to June 19,
1968, or because it was obtained by the
eXl>loitation of an unlawful act occurring prior t o June 19, 1968, shall not
be required unless such information may
be relevant to a pending claim of s uch
inadmissibility ; and
" (3) no claim shall be considered tha t
evidence of a n event is in admissible on
the ground that such evidence was obtained by the exploitation of a n unlawful
act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if
such' event occurred more' than five years
after such allegedly unl awful act .

1I .

the prohibition of § 2515 in claiming that
the evidence sought from them is inadmissible in the grand jury proceedings.
Upon such a claim by a grand jury wit- .
ness, the Government, as "the opponent
of the claim," is required under § 3504
(a) (1) to "affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged" illegal interception.
Section 3504 thus confirms that Congress
meant that grand jury witnesses might
defend contempt charges by invoking the
prohibition of § 2515 against the compelled disclosure of evidence obtained in
violation of Title III.
The Government urges, however, that
the procedures prescribed in § 3504 are
limited in application to claims of inadmissibility based upon illegal intercentions that took place before June 19,1968,
and that § 3504 ~nnot, therefore, provide support for a construction of § 2515.
We disagree. While subsections (a) (2)
and (a) (3) apply only when the illegal
interception took place before June 19,
1968, it is clear both from tlre face of §
3504 13 and from its legislative history
that subsection (a) (1), imposing the
" (b) As used in this section 'unla wful
act' means any act t he use of a ny electronic, mechanical, or other device (as
defined in section 2510 (5 ) of this title)
i~ viola tion of the Constitution or laws
of the United S tates or a n y regulation
or sta ndard promulgat ed pursuant thereto."
N o question as to the constitutionality of
§ 3504 is r aised in these cases.
12. "The onl y exception is t ha t section
350 [4] omits legisla ti ve committees." S.
R ep.No.91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
154 (1969) . In addition, the House
amended § 3504, as passed by the Senate,
so that, unlike § 2515, it "applies only
t o trials and other proceedings conducted
under authority of the United Sta tes."
H .R.Rep.No.91-1549, 91s t Cong., 2d
Sess., 51 (1970), U.S.Code Congo &
Admin.N ews p. 4027.
13. The references to June 19, 1968, ap-

pear onl y in subsections (a ) (2 ) and
(a ) (3) . S ubsection (a) (1) does not
similarly limit t he t erm " unlawful act"
with the phrase " occurring prior to June
See n . 11, supra. It is
19, 1968."
thus plain on t11e face of § .3504 that
Congress did not make the duty imposed

.,
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duty upon "the opponent of the claim" to
"affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged" illegal interception, .is not similarly limite~.
The omission of the June 19, 1968, date
from subsection (a) 0) was not inadvertent. Subsection (a) (1 ) was not
in the original Senate bill, although the
bill did contain counterparts of present
subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) without
the June 19, 1968, or any other date
limitation. 14 · See Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 30 et aI., 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 102-105 (1969 ) . Subsection (a)
(1 ) was added at the suggestion of the
Department of Justice. At that time the
Department followed the practice of
searching Government files for information about wiretaps and eavesdrops. The
Department advised the Senate Judiciary
Committee that while it had been "conduct[ing] such examinations as a matter
of policy even in cases where no motion
hard] been filed
defendants
should be assured such an examination
by a specific requirement of law rather
than hav[ing] to rely upon the continued
viability of a current policy." Id ., at
553. The Senate report on § 3504 explained that "since [subsection (a ) (1)]
requires a pending claim as a predicate to
disclosure, it sets aside the present wasteful practice of the Department of Justice
in searching files without a motion from
a defendant." S.Rep.N 0.91-617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 154 ( 1969).
by subsection (a) (1 ) depen,lent upon the
clnt e of t he alleged illegal interception.
14. T he Senate pnssecl § 3504 in a form t ha t ,

so fn r ns is pertinent to the issue befo re
us, ,liffered from the section as fin ally,
enacted onl y in th at subsections (a) (2 )
and (a) (3) ill the Senate version were
not limit ed in npplication t o ilIegnl interceptions that t ook place befo re .Tune 19,
1968. See S.R ep.No.91-617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., 15, 70 .(1969 ) .
15. " [Subsection (a ) (1)] provides that in
nn attack upon the admissibility of evidence because it is the product of an un-
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The reason assigned in the Senate for
enacting subsection (a) (1) was thus as
applicable to post- as it was to pre-June
19, 1968, interceptions. The same w~
true of the House. There subsection (a)
(1) was supported on the groqnd that it
would be beneficial to the victims of
illegal interceptions. Senator McClellan,
for example, testified before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee that subsection
(a) (1) "places upon the GovernIl).ent an
affirmative duty to answer a claim that
evidence is inadmissible because of unlawful investigative conduct."
"The
first requirement [of § 3504], that the
Gov~rnment admit or deny the occurrence of the alleged invasion of the defendant's rights, actually places or
codifies a burden upon the Government,
rather than the defendant." Hearings
before Subcommittee No.5 of the House
Judiciary Committee on S. 30 et aI., 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 84, 104 (1970). Other
witnesses thought the provision unnecessary,lll Indeed, one organization submitted a report that disapproved subsection (a) (1) on the ground that the
Government should admit illegalities
without a prior claim. Id. at 562 (Section of Criminal Law of the American
Bar Association). It is also significant
that congressional questioning of a representative of the Department of Justice
at the hearings was directed to the Department's views on the insertion of a
date limitation only in subsections (a)
(2) and (a) (3 ). Id., at 659;· see the
Department's written response, id. at
675-676.
la wful net
., the opponent of
such plnim shall affirm or den y the
alleged unla wful act . .
. In this
respect , [ § 3504] is unnecessary." H ea rings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the
House Judiciary Committee on S. 30 et
aI., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 399 (1970) (report of the Committee on F ederal Legislation of the New York County Lawyers'
Associa t ion) . "That is the law now by
Supreme Court decision. [Subsection (a)
(1)] ndds nothing to what exists right
now." [d. , at 513 (testimony of Lawrence
Speiser, representing the American Civil
Liberties Union) .
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The June 19, 1968, date was inserted
in subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) after
the conclusion of the House hearings. It
is apparent from the House report that
only subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) of
the Senate version were to be limited by
the June 19, 1968, date and that subsection (a ) (1) was to be operative without regard to when the alleged illegal
interception may have taken place:
"Paragraph (1) provides that upon
a claim by an aggrieved party that evidence is inadmissible because it is the
primary product of an· unlawful act, or
because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent
of the claim must affirm or deny the
occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.
Under this provision, 'upon a charge by
the defendant with standing to challenge the alleged unlawful conduct, the
Government would be ·r equired to affirm or deny that an unlawful act
involving electronic surveillance had in
fact occurred. If such an unlawful act
had in fact occurred, paragraph (2),
below, will govern disclosure of the
contents of the electronic surveillance
records or transcripts to the defendant
and his counsel, unless paragraph (3)
16. Congress, of course, wa s pri marily concerned with "certain evidentiary problems
creat ed by electronic surveillan ce conduct ed by the Government prior to the
en actment of [Title III] on June 19,
1968, which provided statutory' aut hority
for obtaining surveillan ce warrant s in
certain t ypes of criminal in vestiga tions
(18 U .S.C. 2516) ." H.R.Rep.N o.91-1549,
91st Cong., 2d Sess" 50 (1970) U .S. Code
Congo & Admin.News p. 4026. As the '
Senate report noted, however, § 3504 applies to " [c]ivil ' as well as criminal proceedings .
., rega rdless of w hether
a government or governmental body or
officer is or is not a pa rty or witness."
S.Rep.No.91-617, 91st Cong., 1s t Sess.,
154 (1969). Moreover , "unlawful a cts,"
as defined in § 31?04(b) , may be "act s , of
private citizens a s well as acts of Feder al
or S tate officials." Ibid.
17. "Under pa ragra ph (2) disclosure of the
information shall be required to be made
to a defendant who has demons trated the
illegality of the electronic surveillance
(occurring p rior to June 19, 1968 ) and his

applies."
H.R.Rep.No.91-1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 51 (1970) , U.S.Code
Congo & Admin.News, p. 4027.
This explanation demonstrates that "the
opponent of the claim" 16 has a duty to
"affirm or deny" whenever "a party aggrieved" "claim[s]
that evidence is inadmissible because it is"
derived from an illegal interception. The
date June 19, 1968, becomes relevant only
after it is determined that an illegal
interception took place and an issue thus
arises as to disclosure of information
bearing on the claim.I7
III
The Government argues, finally, that
while § 2515 could be construed to allow
a grand jury witness to invoke its
prohibition as a defense ' to a contempt
charge, "[i]f this section were the only
relevant portion of [Title-III] ," Brief in
No. 71-263, at 19, proceedings before
grand juries are omitted ft:om another
provision of Title III, § 2518(10) (a),
that authorizes "[a]ny aggrieved person," 18 in specified types of proceedings,
to "move to suppress the contents of any
intercepted wire or oral communicat,ion,
or evidence derived' therefrom." 19 But
'standing where such information is or
' may be' relevant to a claim of inadmissibilit y. In cases where the electronic
s urveillance occurred on or a fte r June
19, 1968, disclosure is manda tory where
illegality and st anding are . demonstrat ed.
T he provis ion thus alters the procedure
announced in Alderina n v. United Stat es,
89 S.Ct. 961, 394 U. S. 165, 22 L.Ed.2d
176 (1968 ) [ sic ] wi th respect to 'unlawful
acts' commitfed prior to J une 19, 1968."
H .R.Rep.No.91-1549 , 91st Cong., 2d S ess .,
51 (1970), U .S.Code Congo & A dmin.
News p. 4027.
18. An "aggrieved person," for purposes of
§ 2518 (10) (a) , is " a person who ~as a
party to a n y intercepted wire or oral
communication or a person against whom
the interception was direct ed." 18 U .S.
C . § 2510(11 ); see S.Rep.No.1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., · 91, 106 (1968 ) , U. S.
Code . Congo & A dmin .News, p. 2112.
19. S ect ion 2518 (10) provides in pertinent
pa rt :
.
" Any aggrieved person in a n y trial, hea ring, or p roceeding in or before any court.
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it does not follow from the asserted omis- to testify and attempts. to def~nd a subsion of grand jury proceedings from the sequent charge of con~mpt. Hence, we
suppression provision that grand jury cannot agree that the Senate report exwitnesses cannot invoke § 2515 as a pressed the view that a grand jury witdefense in a contempt proceeding under ness would be foreclosed from raising
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a).20 The congressional the § 2515 defense in a contempt proconcern with the applicability of § 2518 ceeding under § 1826(aY.
(10) (a) in grand jury proceedings, so'
far as it is discernible from the Senate
[4] Furthermore, grand jury witreport, wa.s apparently that defendants nesses do not normally discover whether
and potential defendants might be able to they may refuse to answer questions by
utilize suppression motions to impede the filing motions to suppress their potential
issuance of indictments: "Normally, testimony: The usual procedure is, upon
there is no limitation on the character of the Government's motion, to have a court
evidence that may be presented to a grand order a grand jury witness to testify
jury, which is enforcible by an individual. upon penalty of contempt for nqncom(Blue v. United States, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 384 p}iance. Section 1826(a) embodies that
U.S. 251 [16 L.Ed.2d 510] (1965) [sic].) traditional procedure.
The asserted
There is no intent to change this general omission of grand jury proceedings from
rule." S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d § 2518(10) (a) may well reflect congres~
Sess., 106 (1968), U.S.Code Congo & Ad- sional acceptance of that · procedure as
min.News, p. 2195. The "general rule," adequate in these cases. Consequently,
as illustrated in Blue, is that a defendant we cannot suppose that Congress, by
is not entitled to have his indictment dis- providing procedures for suppression mo- _
missed before trial simply because the tions, intended to deprive grand jury
Government "acquire[d] incriminating witnesses of the § 2515 defense that
evidence in violation of the [law]," even would otherwise be available to them.
if the "tainted evidence was presented to Although the Government points to statethe grand jury." 384 U.S., at 255. and n. ments in the Senate report to the Elffect
3, 86 S.Ct., at 1419; see Lawn V. United that § 2518(10) .<a) "limits" § 2515, we
States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L. read those statements to mean that supEd.2d 321 (1958); Costello V. United . pression motions, as a method of
States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 enforcing the prohibition of § 2515, must
L.Ed. 397 (1956).Eut that rule has be made in accordance with the restricnothing whatever to do with the situation tions upon forums, procedures, and
of a grand jury witness who has refused grounds specified in § 2518(10) (a).21

,.

(Iel)artment, officer, agency, regulatory
body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral comm\mication, or evidence derived therefrom

-

.

-

While on its face § 2518(10) (n) al)l)lies
to grand jury proceedings, when compared with the list of proceedings in
§ 2515, see n. 2, supra, it appears that
"grand jury" was omitted from the list
in § 2518(10) (a). .
20. "Because no person is a party as such
to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of a
motion to suppress in the context of such
a proceeding itself.
It is the
intent of the provision only that- when a
motion to suppress is granted in an-

other context, its scope may include use
in a future grand jury proceeding." ·S .
Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 106
(1968), U.S.Code Congo & Admin.News,
p. 2195. This assertion is not' unambiguous, for motions to suppress evidence
to be presented to a grand jury would
presumably be made in court.
21. "This definition [§ 2510 (.11)] defines
the class of those who are entitled to .
in voke the suppression sanction of section 2515
through the motion
to suppress provided for by section 2518
(10) (a)
" S.Rep.No.1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 91 (1968), U.S.
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2179. "The
provision [§ 2515] must, of course, be
read in light of section 2518(10) (a) . .
which defines the class entitled to make' a
motion to suppress." Id., at 96, U.S.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in No. 71-110 is
reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 22 The judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Third. Circuit in No. 71263 is affirrned. 23
It is so ordered.

ent cases a grand jury witness seeks to
prove and vindicate suspected unconstitutional seizures of his own telephone
conversations. And, in every relevant
respect, the proceedings below were in
striking parallel to those in Silverthorne
Lumber CO. V. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319.

In that case, after federal agents unlawfully seized papers belonging to the
Silverthornes and to their lumber company, the documents were returned upon
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.
order of the court. In the interim, howAlthough I join in the opinion of the ever, the agents had copied them. After
Court, I believe that, independently of returning the seized originals, the proseany statutory I refuge which Congress cutor attempted to regain possession of
may choose to provide, the Fourth them by issuing a grand jury subpoena
Amendment shields a grand jury witness duces tecum. When the respondents refrom any question (or any subpoena) . fused to comply with the subpoena they
. which is based upon information gar- were convicted of contempt. In reversnered from searches which invade his ing those judgments, this Court through
own constitutiQ..nally protected privacy.
Mr. Justice Holmes, held that the Government
was barred from reaping any
I would hold that Title III of the 1968
Act offends the Fourth Amendment, as fruit from its forbidden act and wove
does all wiretapping and bugging, for into our constitutional fabric the cele- .
reasons which I have often expressed brated maxim that "the essence of a proelsewhere. E . g., Cox v. United· States, vision forbidding the acquisition of evi405 U.S. - , 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d dence in a certain way is that not merely
136 ; Williamson v. United States, 404 evidence sCI acquired shall not be used
U.S. - , 92 S.Ct. 1323, 31 L.Ed.2d 487; before the Court but that it shall not be
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359, used at all." 251 U.S., at 392, 40 S.Ct.,
88 S.Ct. 507, 515, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; Ber- at 183.
ger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64, 87 S.Ct.
Petitioners Gelbard and Parnas and re1873, 1886 t 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 ; Osborn spondents Egan and Walsh occupy posiv._ United States, 385 U.S. 323, 340, 87 tions which,are virtually identical to that
-S.Ct. 429, 438, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 ; Pugach of the Silverthornes and their company.
v. Dollinger, 365 U.S 458, 459, 81 S.Ct. They desire to demonstrate that but for
650, 5 L.Ed.2d 678 ; On Lee v. Uniteq unlawful surveillance of them the grand
States, 343 U.S. 747, 762, 72 S.Ct. 967; jury would not now be seeking testimony
976, 96 L.Ed. 1270. In each of the pres- from them. And, as in Silverthorne,
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

v

Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2185. "This
provision [ § 2518 (10) (a) ] must be read
in connection wit h sections 2515 and
2517.
. which it limits. It provides tbe remedy for the right created by
section 2515."
I d. , at 106, · U.S.Code
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2195.
22. B ecause the District Court and the
Court of Appeals erroneously held that
grand jury witnesses have no right t o
invoke a § 2515 defense in contempt proceedings under § 1826 (a) , we n eed not decide whether Gelbard and Parnas may
refuse to answer questions if the intercep-

t ions of their con versations were pursuant to court order. That is a matter for the District Court to consider
in the first instance.
23. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgments of contempt and remanded for hea rings to determine whether the questions
asked respondents resulted from the illegal
interception of their communications. 450
F .2d, at 217. Although, in this Court,
the Government now denies t hat there
was any overhearing, in view of our affirmance that is a matter for the District
Court to consider in the fi rst instance.
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they are the victims of the alleged violations, seeking to mend no one's privacy
other than their. own. Finally, here, as
there, the remedy preferred is permission to refuse to render the requested
information.

1

-

Unless Silverthorne is to be overruled
and uprooted from those decisions which
have followed it, such as Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-341, _60
S.Ct. 266, 267-268, 84 L.Ed. 307; Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 103, 78
S.Ct. 155, 159, 2 L.Ed.2d 126 ; Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct.
1437, 1444, 4 - L.Ed.2d 1669; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1684,
1687-=-1688, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081; Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83
S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Harrison
I . At oral a rgument, counsel for the United

States contended that Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, was distinguishable. First, it was said that in
this case there has yet been no showing of
Ulegal surveillance. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26.
The point is, however, that these ' witnesses claim to be able to make such a
showing, although none of the trial
courts below have permitted hea~ings
on the issue.
Second, it was also
argued that Silverthorne was inapposite
because there the very papers seized un ~
lawfully were the ones later sought under
the court's subpoena. Ibid. But there is
little doubt that Justice Holmes' reasoning would also have relieved the Silverthornes from testifying before the grand
jury as to the contents of the purloined
papers.
2. Three of the cases cited by the Solicitor
General stand for nothing more than the
rule that. a defendant may not challenge
prior to trial the evidence from which the
indictment was ' drawn.
Costello v.
United States,-350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406,
100 L.Ed. 397; Lawn v. United States,
355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d
321 ; United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251,
86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510. To be
sure, the other authorities cited rejected
various privileges from testifying but only
for reasons which are not in conflict
with Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64
L.Ed. 319. For example, in Murphy v.
'Vaterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.
92 S.Cl.-149
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v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88
S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047; and
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
171, 177, 89 S.Ct. 961, 965, 968-969,
-22 L.Ed.2d 176, these witnesses deserve
opportunities to prove their allegations
and, if successful, to withhold from the
Government any , further rewards of its
"dirty business." Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 48 S.Ct. 564,
575,72 L. Ed. 944 (Holmes, J ., dissenting).
The Solicitor General does not propose
that Silverthorne be overruled. N or does
he deny its remarkable similarity. Indeed, his analysis of the constitutional
issue at stake here fails even to mention
that landmark decision. 1 And none of
the precedents cited by him detract from
Silverthorne's vitality.2
Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678; and Piemonte
United States, 367 U.S. 556, 81 ' S.Ct.
1720, 6 L .EI1.2d 1028, in light of our
dispositions in those cases, no threatened constitutional violation remained' as
a predicate for a privilege: For in
lIfU1'phy we eliminated the threat that
testimony to a state granl1 jury given in
exchange for a state immunity grant
could, despite the witness' fears to the
contrary, be used against him by other
jurisdictions. And in P'i emonte the Fifth
Amendment basis for declining to answer
was dissolved by the majority's finding
that there had been a proper gJ:.ant of
immunity.
True, Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114, 121,62 S.Ct. 1000,
1004, 86 L.Ed. 1312, and Alderman v.
Unitell States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct.
961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, denied standing todefendants to suppress the fruits of
Fourth Amendment injuries to others, but
that issue is not presented here inasmuch
as all of these movants purported to be
victims of intel'p.epted conversations.
Finally, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979, held that
a grand jury witness may not withholll
evidence solely because he believes that the
statutes (which the grand jury suspects
may have been violated) are unconstitutional. Tliat contention, of course, has
not been tendered by these grand jury
witnesses. Moreover, Blair itself recognizes that "for special reasons a ,witness
may be excused from telling all that he
knows. " Id., 281, 39 S.Ct. 471. "Special r easons" presumably was meant to
include Fourth Amendment grounds, as
V.
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Rather, the Government treat s this decision as a "novel extension" of Fourth
Amendment protections, leaning heavily
upon the observation that the exclusion
ary rule has never been extended to "provide that illegally seized evidence is iIiadmissible against anyone for any purpose." Alderman, supra, 394 U.S. at 175,
'89 S.Ct. at 967. This aphorism is contravened, concludes the Solicitor General,
by any result permitting a nondefendant
to "suppress" evidence sought to be introduced at another's trial or to withhold
testimony from a grand jury investigation of someone else.
o

-

.To be sure, no majority of this Court
has ever held that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment." I d. , 174,
89 S.Ct., 967. But that concern is not at
stake here. No one is attempting to assert vicariously the rights of others.
Here it is only necessary to adhere to
the basic principle that victims of unconstitutional practices are themselves entitled to effective remedies. For, "where
federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed.
939. And see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619.
The fact that the movants below
sought to withhold evidence \ does not
transform these cases into unusual ones.
A witness is often permitted to retain exclusive custody of information where a
contrary course would jeopardize important liberties such as First Amendment
guarantees, Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1F3, 1 L.Ed.2d
1273; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
463,78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 ;
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigatwas permitted shortly thereafter in Silvet··
thorne.
3. E. g., Alexander v. United States, 138

U.S. 353, 11 S.Ct. 350, 34 L.Ed. 954
(lawyer-client); Blau v. United States,

ing Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct.
889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 i Baird v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 1, 6-7, 91 S.Ct . 702, 705-706,
27 L.Ed.2d 639; In re Stolar, 401 U.S.
23, 91 S.Ct. 713, 27 L.Ed.2d 657 ; Fifth
Amendment privileges, Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95
L.Ed. 1118, or traditional testimonial
pri vileges. 3
The same is true of Fourth Amendment authority to withhold evidence,
even from a grand jury. Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 ;
Silverthorne, supra.
Noone would
doubt, for example, that under Bell v .
Hood, supra, and Bivens (or Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.
Ed.2d 492, where state police were concerned) a telephone subscriber could obtain an injunction against unlawful wiretapping of his telephone despite the fact
that such termination might remove
from the Government's reach evidence
with which it could convict third parties.
A contrary judgment today would cripple enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. For, if these movants, whom the
Solicitor General concedes are not the
prosecutors' targets, were required to
submit to interrogation, then they (unlike prospective defendants) would have
no further opportunity to vindicate their
InJurIes. More generally, because surveillances are often "directed primarily
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to subversive
forces, and are not an attempt to gather
evidence for specific criminal prosecutions," United States v. United States
District Court, 405 U.S. - , - , 92
S.Ct. - , - , 32 L.Ed.2d - , the normal exclusionary threat of We~ks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341,
58 L.Ed. 652, would be sharply attenuated and intelligence centers would be
loosed from virtually every deterrent
340 U.S. 332, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306
(marital); United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727
(military aircraft specifications).

!
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against abuse. 4
Furthermore, even
where the "uninvited ear" is used to
obtain criminal convictioris, rather than
for domestic spying, a rule different
from our result today would supply police
with an added incentive to record the
conversations of suspected coconspirators in order to marshall evidence against
alleged ringleaders. We are told that
"[p J olice are often tempted to make illegal searches during the investigations
of a large conspiracy. Once the police
have established That several individuals
are involved, they may deem it worthwhile to violate the constitutional rights
of one member of the conspiracy (particularly a minor member) in order to obtain evidence for use against others."
White & Greenspan, Standing to Object
to Search and Seizure, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev.
333,351 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Because defendants are normally denied
"standing" to suppress evidence procured
as a result of invasions of others' privacies today's remedy is necessary to help
neutralize the prosecutorial reward of
such tactics.
Today's remedy assumes an added and
critical measure of importance for, due to
the clandestine nature of electronic eavesdropping, other inhibitions on officers'
abuse, such as the threat of damage actions, reform through the political process, and adverse publicity; will be of little avail in guarding privacy.
Moreover, when a court assists the
Government in extracting fruits from the
victims ~f its lawless searches Oi't degrades the integrity of the Judicial system. For "[nJothing can destroy a gov·
ernment more quickly than its failure
to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659,
81 S.Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. For
4. Our remark in United States v. United
States District Court, 405 U.S. - , 92
S.Ct. - , 32 L.Ed.2d - , was our understanding only of the motivation behind _ federal national security wiretapping. But the statistical evidence shows
that nonsecurity wiretapping also is
seldom used to convict criminals. In
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this reason, our decisions have embraced
the view that '~[tJhe tendency of those
who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by_ means
of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions
should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts, which
are at all times charged with support of
the Constitution." Weeks ' v. United
States, 232 U;S. 383, 390, 34 S.Ct. 341,
344, 58 L.Ed. 652. As mentioned earlier,
this principle was at the heart of the
Silverthorne decision. Later in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 470, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed.
944, a case in which federal wiretappers
had violated an Oregon law, Justice
Holmes, citing Silverthorne, thought that
both the officers and the court were honor bound to observe the state law: "If
the existing code does not permit district
attorneys to hllVe a hand in such dirty
business it does not permit the judge to
allow such iniquities to succeed." In the
same case, Justice Brandeis, who was
then alone in his view that wiretapping
was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, phrased it this way:
"In a· government 'of laws, existence of
the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Id., 485, 48 S.Ct., 575.In an entrapment case, Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justices Harlan, Brennan, and I joined, thought that "the federal courts have an obligation to set their
face against enforcement of the law by
lawless means" because "[pJublic confi1969, court-ordered federal wiretapping
seized 44,940 conversations but only 24
convictions were obtained. In 1970, federal court orders permitted the 'seizure of
147,780 communications with 48 convictions. H. Schwartz, A Report on the
Costs and Benefits of Electronic Surveillance ii-iv (1971).
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dence in the fair and honorable adminisUnder 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) a witness
tration of justice, upon Whi.ch ultimately who refuses to testify "without just
depends the rule of law, is the transcend- cause" may be held in. contempt of court.
ing value at stake." Sherman v. United Here, grand jury witnesses are involved,
States, 356 U.S. 369, 380, 78 S.Ct. 819, and the just cause claimed to excuse
825, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (dissenting opinion); them is that the testimony demanded insee also his opinion for the Court in Nar- volves the disclosure and use of comdone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340- . munications allegedly intercepted in vio341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 267-268, 84 L.Ed. 307. lation of the controlling federal statute
In a Self-Incrimination Clause decision, and hence inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. §
Justice Brennan ( joined by Justice Mar- 2515.
shall and myself) used fewe~ words: "it
The United States ass~rts that § 2515
i s monstrous that courts should aid or affords no excuse to grand jury witnessabet the lawbreaking police officer." es under any circumstances. Reliance is
Harris v. New York, 401 U ~S. 222, 23 2, placed on § 2518(10) (a) and the legisla91 S.Ct. 643, 649, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (dissent- tive history of the statute. I agree with
ing ) .
the Court, however, that at least where
These s tandards are at war with the the United States has intercepted comGover~ment' s
claim that intelligence munications without a warrant in ciragencies may invoke the aid of the courts cumstances where court approval was
in order to compound their neglect of required, it is appropriate in construing
constitutional values. To be sure, at and applying 28 U.S.C. § 1826 not to resome point taint may become so attenu- quire the grand jury witness to answer
ated that ignoring the original blunder and hence further the plain policy of
will not breed contempt for law. But the wiretap statute. This unquestionhere judges are not asked merely to over- ably works a change in the law with relook infractions diminished by time and spect to the ' rights of grand jury witindependent events. Rather, if these wit- nesses, but it is a change rooted in a
nesses' allegations ar e correct, judges are complex statute the meaning of which
being invited to become the handmaidens is not immediately obvious as the opinof intentional 5 police lawlessness by or- ions filed today so tellingly demonstrate.
dering these victims to elaborate on ,t heir
Where the Government produces a
telephonic communications of which the
court
order for the interception, howprosecutors would have no knowledge but
and
the witness nevertheless deever,
for their unconstitutional surveillance.
mands a full blown suppression hearing
In summary, I believe that Silver- to determine the legality of the order,
thorne was rightly decided, that it was there may be room for striking a differrooted in our continuing policy to equip ent accommodation between the due
victims of unconstitutional searches with functioning of the grand jury system
effective means of redress, that it has and the federal wiretap statute. Supenjoyed repeated praise in subsequent pression hearings in these circumstances
decisions, that it has not been seriously would result in protracted interruption
challenged here, and that it r equires that of grand jury proceedings. At the same
we affirm the Third Circuit in Egan and time prosecutors and other officer s who
Walsh and reverse the Ninth Cir cuit in have been granted and relied on a court
order for the interception would be subGelbard and Parnas.
ject to no liability under the statute,
Mr. Justice WHITE, concurring in the whether the order is valid or not ; ·a nd
in any event, the deterrent value of exCourt's opinion and judgment.
I

5. As J ustice Fort as said, wireta pping " is
usually the product of calculated, official
decision rather than the error of an in-

dividual agent of the st ate." Alderman
v. United States, . 394 U.S. 165, 203, 89
S.Ct. 961, 982, 22 L .Ed.2d 176.

.,
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cluding the evidence will be marginal at
best. It is weil, therefore, that the Court
has left this issue open for consideration
by the District Court on remand. See
n. 22, p. 2368, ante.
Of course, where the Government officially denies the fact of electronic
surveillance of the. witness, the matter is
at an end and ·the witness must answer.
J.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice
BLACKMUN, and Mr. Justice POWELL
join, dissenting.
Disposition of this case depends on the
sorting out of admittedly conflicting implications from different sections of the
principal statute involved. The Court's
conclUsion, .while supportable if regard
be had only for the actual language of
the sections, is by no means compelled by
that language. Its conclusion is reached
in utter disregard for the relevant legislative history, and quite without consideration of the sharp break which it
represents with the historical m'odus
operandi of the grand jury. It is, in
my opinion, wrong.

f

The Court states the question to be
whether witnesses threatened with contempt uD"der 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) "are
entitled to invoke this' prohibition of §
2515 as a defense to contempt charges
brought against them for refusing to
testify." Ante, p. 2359. The question as
thus framed by the Court has been so
abstracted and refined, and divorced
from the particulars of these two cases,
as to virtually invite the erroneous answer which the opinion of the .Court
gives.
N or is it accurate to "assume" as the
Court does that the Government's overhearing of these witnesses was in violation of the applicable statute. Petitioner
Gelbard contended' in the trial court that
I. In t he case of respondents E gan and

Walsh, the government in the District
Court did not state whethe r it had engaged
in electronic surveillance. In this Court,
however, the government represented that
respondents Egan and Walsh had not been
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the United States planned to use his
electronically overheard conversations as
one basis for questioning him before the
grand jury, and so stated in a presentation to that court. The Government in
a reply affidavit stated that whatever
information had been gathered. as a result of electronic overhearing had been
obtained' from wiretaps conducted pursuant to court order as provided in 18
U.S.C. § 2518. 1 Parnas, .so far as this
record shows, made no similar allegation
in the trial court. The Court of Appeals
in its opinion described the position
taken by these witnesses in the following
language ~
"When cited for contempt in the district court, each attacked the constitutional validity of § 2518, and additionally urged' that he should not be required to testify until and unless first
allowed to inspect all applications, orders, tapes and transcripts relating to
such an electronic surveillance and afforded an opportunity to suppress the
use before the grand jury of any. evidence so secured
"
Thus what was presented to the trial
court in this proceeding under 18 U:S.C.
§ 1826(a) was not a neatly stipulated
question of law, but a demand by the
petitioners that they be permitted to
roam at will among the prosecutor's
records . in order to see whether they
might be able to turn up any evidence indicating that the · Government's overhearing of their conversations had been
unauthorized by statute. In order to determine whether this particular type of
remedy is open to these petitioners at
this particular stage of potential criminal proceedings i,!; is not enough to recite, as the Court does, that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 prohibits the use of illegally
overheard wire communications before
grand juries as well as before other governmental bodies. This proposition is
subj ected to electronic surveillance. In
light of this development, I w~uld remand
these cases to the District Court in order
to give the respondents another opportuni.
ty to testify.
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not disputed. The far more difficult inquiry posed by these facts is whether
the granting to these petitioners at this
particular stage of these proceedings of
sweeping discovery as a prelude to a full
hearing on the issue of alleged unlawful
surveillance can fairly be inferred from
the enactment by Congress of the two
statutes relied on in the Court's opinion.
I

It may be helpful at the outset to treat
briefly the background of 28 U.S.C. §
1826(a). As the Court notes, this provision ' was enacted as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970; and
the Senate Report states that it was intended to codify the "existing practice
of the federal courts." The existing
practice of the federal courts prior to the
enactment of this section was based on
Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 42 and on 18
U.S.C. § 401, both of which dealt generally with the power of courts to punish for contempt. The enactment of §
1826(a) appears to have resulted from a
desire on the part of Congress to treat
separately from the general contempt
power of courts their authority to deal
with recalcitrant witnesses in court or
grand jury proceedings. Since, as the
Senate Report states, the enactment of
this provision was designed to "codify
the existing practice", it is instructive to
note the types of claims litigated in connection with grand jury matters under
Rule 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401 prior to the
enactment of this new section. So far
as the reported decisions of this Court
and of the lower federal courts reveal,
prior litigation with respect to grand
juries has dealt almost exclusively with
questions of privilege, and most of these
cases have dealt with issues of the privilege against self-incrimination. While
it is plain that the respondent in such
proceedings was entitled to a hearing and
to adduce evidence, it is equally plain
2. See, e. g., Blau v. United States,
U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223, 95 L.Ed.
(1950); Rogers v. United States,
U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed.
(1951) ; Curcio v. United States, 354

340
170
340
344
U.S.

that the typical hearing was short in
duration and largely devoted to the arguments of counsel on an agreed statemeilt of facts. 2
Some of the flavor of the type of proceeding contemplated under the prior •
practice is gleaned from the following
passage in the Court's opinion in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370,
86 S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (citations omitted):
"There can be no question that courts
have an inherent power to enforce
compliance with their lawful orders to
civil contempt
And it is
essential that courts be able to compel
the appearance and testimony of witnesses .
. A grand jury subpoena must command the same respect
. Where contempt consists of
a refusal to obey a court order to testify at any stage in judicial proceedings, the witness may be confined until compliance .
"
These proceedings seem almost invariably to have been short and summary in
nature, not because the defendant was
to be denied a fair hearing, but because
the type of issue that could be raised at
such a proceeding was one which did not
generally permit extensive factual development. Even where a court of appeals reversed a contempt adjudication
because of the district court's failure to
allow the defendant to testify on his
own behalf with respect to material issues, there was no hint of either the
right to, or the necessity for, any discovery proceedings against the Government. Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d
219 (CAl 1954).
Congress was of course free to expand
the scope of inquiry in these proceedings,
to enlarge the issues ' to be tried, and
to alter past practice in any other way
that it chose consistently with the Constitution. But in view of the stated con118, 77 S.Ct. 1145, 1 L.Ed.2d 1225
(1957); United States v. George, 444 F.
2d 310 (CA6 1971); In re October 1969
Grand Jury, 435 F.2d 350 (CA7 1970).
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gressional intent to "codify existing
practice" by the enactment of § 1826(a),
we should require rather strong evidence
of congressional purpose to conclude that
Congress intended to engraft on the traditional and rather summary contempt
hearings a new type of hearing in which
a grand jury witness is accorded carte
blanche discovery of all of the Government's "applications, orders, tapes, and
transcripts relating to electronic surveillance" before he may be required to
testify.
II

, "

Just as Congress was not writing on a
clean slate in the area of contempt hearings, it was not writing on a clean slate
with respect to the nature of grand jury
proceedings. These petitioners were
called before a grand jury that had been
convened to inv.estigate violations of federal gambling laws. We deal, therefore,
not with the rights of a criminal defendant in the traditional adversary context of a trial, but with the status of
witnesses summoned to testify before a
body devoted to sifting evidence that
could result in the presentment of criminal charges. Just as the cases arising
under the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. §
1826 (a) suggest a limitation on the type
of issue which may be litigated in such
a proceeding, cases dealing with the r.ole
of the grand jury stress the unique
breadth of its scope of inquiry. In
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979
(1919), this Court defined the vital investigatory function of the grand jury:
"It is a grand inquest, a body with
powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is
n9t to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the
probable result of the investigation, or
by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has
been said before, the identity of the
offender, and the precise nature of
the offense, if there be one, normally
are developed at the conclusion of the
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grand jury's labors, not at the beginning.
"
Another passage from Blai1' pointed
out the citizen's obligation to obey the
process of the grand jury:
.
"It is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance
upon court or grand jury in order to
testify are public duties which every
person within the jurisdiction of the
government is bound to perform upon
being properly summoned." Id., at
281 39 S.Ct., at 471.

In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed.
397 (1956), the Court traced the development of the English grand jury and
concluded that the probable intent of the
Framers of our Constitution was to parallel that institution as it had existed in
England where "grand jurors were selected from the body of the people and
their work was not hampered by rigid
procedural or evidential rules." 350
U.S., at 362, 76 S.Ct., at 408. The
Court in Costello was at pains to point
out the necessity of limiting the nature
of challenges to evidence adduced before
a grand jury if that body were to retain
its traditional comprehensive investigative authority: .
"If indictments were to be held open
to challenge on the ground that there
was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed.
The result of such a rule would be that
before trial on the merits a defendant
could alway.s insist on the kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury." ,350 U.S., at
363, 76 S.Ct., at 408.

While this general statement applied
by its terms only to one who was ultimately indicted by the 'grand ' jury, its
reasoning applies with like force to one
who seeks to make an evidentiary challenge to grand jury proceedings on the
basis of his status as a prospective witness. Indeed, time-consuming challenges
by witnesses during the course of a
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grand jury investigation would be far
more inimical to the function of that
body than would a motion to dismiss an
indictment . after it had concluded its
deliberations.

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct.
1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), and Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct.
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), Congress in
1967 undertook to draft comprehensive
.
legislation
both authorizing the use of
In Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
evidence
obtained
by electronic surveil339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 the
lance
on
specified
conditions,
and prohibCourt refused to accord to petitioners
the hearing, prior to trial, on the issue iting its use otherwise. ' S.Rep. No. 1097,
of whether or not Ii grand jury which in- 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67, U.S.Code Congo
dicted them had made direct or deriva- & Admin.News, p. 2112. The ultimate
tive use of materials the use of which result was the Omnibus Act of 1968.
by an earlier grand jury' had been held Critical to analysis of the issue involved
to violate the defendant's privilege here are §§ 2515 and 2518(10) (a) of
against self-incrimination. In support- that Act, which provide in pertinent part
ing its conclusiQn that the defendant as follows:
should not even be accorded a hearing to
"Whenever any wire or oral communisustain these contentions, the Court
cation has been intercepted, no part
quoted a passage from Costello describof the contents of such communication
ing the grand jury as
and no evidence derived therefrom
may
be received in evidence in any
"[an] institution, in which laymen
trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in
conduct their ' inquiries unfettered by
or
before
any court, grand jury, detechnical rules. Neither justice nor
partment,
officer, agency, regulatory
the concept of a fair trial requires
body,
legislative
committee, or other
such a change. In a trial on the merauthority
if the disclosure
its, defendants are entitled to a strict
of
that
information
would
be in violaobservance of all the rules designed to
tion
of
this
chapter."
§
2515.
bring about a fair verdict. - Defendants are not entitled, howeyer, to a
rule which would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial." 355 U.S., at
350, 78 S.Ct., at 318.
It seems to me to be clear beyond cavil
from these cases that prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Crime and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, a hearing such as
that which the Court awards these petitioners was not only unauthorized by law,
but completely contrary to the ingrained
principles which have long governed the
functioning of the grand jury.

III
When Congress set out to enact the
two statutes on.-which the Court relies, it
was certainly not with any announced
intent to change the nature' of contempt
hearings relating to grand jury proceedings, or to change the modus operandi of
the grand jury! Instead, largely in response I to the decisions of this Court in

"Any aggrieved person in any trial,
hearing, or proceeding in or before any
court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to
suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the
grounds that"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
"(ii) the order of authorization or
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
"(iii) the interception was not made
in conformity with the order of au. "§
thorization or approval .
2518(10) (a).
Here is presented at the very least an
implied conflict between two separate
sections of the same Act. Section 2515
proscribes generally the use of unlaw-

-,
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fully intercepted communications as evidence before a number of specified
bodies, including a grand jury. Section
2518(10) (a) provides for the type of
hearing which petitioners sought and
were denied by the District Court; it
prQvides such hearings in connection
with a number of specified legal proceedings, but it conspicuously omits proceedin'g s before a grand jury. The method by which the Court solves this dilemma
is to state that if petitioners succeed after
their discovery in establishing their claim
of unlawful electronic surveillance, their
questioning before the grand jury on the
basis of such electronic surveillance
would violate § 2515, as of course it presumptively would. Therefore, says the
Court, petitioners must be entitled to the
discovery and factual hearing which' they
seek, even though § 2518(10) (a) rather
clearly denies it to them by implication.
A construction which I believe at least
equally plausible, based simply on the
juxtaposition of the various sections of
the statute, is that § 2515 contains a basic
proscription of certain conduct, but does
not attempt to specify remedies or rights
arising from a breach of that proscription; the specification of remedies is left
to other sections. Other sections provide
several ' remedies; criminal and civil
sanctions are imposed by §§ 2511 and
2520, whereas § 2518(10) (a) accords a
right to a suppression hearing in specified cases. Thus the fact that one who
may be the victim of alleged unlawful
surveillance on the part of the Government is not accorded' an Alderman-type
suppression hearing under the provisions
of § 2518(10) (a) is not left remediless
to such a degree that it must be presumed
to have been an oversight; he is remitted
to the institution of civil proceedings, or
the filing of a complaint leading to the
institution of a criminal prosecution.
While the latter two remedies may not be
as efficacious in many situations as a
suppression hearirig, the remission of an
aggrieved party to those remedies certainly does not render nugatory the general proscription contained in § 2515.
92 S.Ct.-149 1/z

The omission of "grand jury" from the
designated forums in § 2518(10) (a) is
not explainable on the basis that though
the testimony is sought to be adduced before a grand jury, the motion to suppress
would actually be made in a court, which
is one of the forums designated in § 2518
(10) (a) . The language "in any trial,
hearing, or proceeding in or before" quite
cIearly refers to the forum in which the
testimony is sought to be adduced. But
even more significant is the inclusion
among the designated forums of "department" . "officer" "agency" and "regula-.
tory body." Congress has almost without exception provided that issues as to
the legality and propriety of subpoenas
issued by either agencies or executive
departments should be resolved by the
courts. It has accomplished this result
by requiring the agency to bring an independent judicial action to . enforce
obedience to its subpoena. See, e. g., 15
U.S.C. § 79r, Utility Holding Company
Act; 15 U.S.C. § 78u, Securities Exchange Act ; 41 U.S.C. § 35-45, WalshHealy Public Contracts Act; 50 U.S.C.
App. 2U,5, Defense Production Act of
1950; 47 U.S.C. § 49, Communications
Act; 46 U.S.C. § 1124, Merchant Marine
Act of 1946 ; 26 U.S.C. § 7604 Internal
Revenue Act; 16 U .S.C. § 825f (c),
Electric Utility Companies Act; 15 U.S.
C. § 717m (d), Natural Gas Act; 7 U.
S.C. § 511n, Tobacco InspeGtion Act.
This general mode of e~forcement of
agency investigative subpoenas was discussed in the context of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66
S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946).
Thus if Congress in § 2518 had intended to focus on the forum in which the
hearing as to the legality of the subpoena is to be determined, rather than
the forum in which the testimony is
sought to be ' adduced, it would have
omitted not only grand juries, but departments, officers, agencies, and regulatory bodies as weB from the coverage
of § 2518(10) (a). For questions as to
the legality of subpoenas issued by all
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these bodies are resolved in the courts.
By omitting only grand juries in § 2518,
Congress indicated that it was gealing
with the forum in which the testimony
was sought to be adduced, and that the
suppression hearing authorized by the
section was not to be available to grand
jury witnesses.
In the light of these conflicting implications from the statutory language itself, resort to the legislative history is
appropriate. Passages from the legislative history cited by the · Court in its
opinion do not focus at all on the availability of a suppression hearing in grand
jury proceedings; they simply speak in
general terms of the congressional intent
to prohibit and penalize unlawful electronic surveillance, of which intent there
can of course be no doubt. But several
parts of the legislative history address
themselves, far more particularly than
any relied upon by the Court in its opinion, to the actual issue before us. The
Senate Report, for example, indicates as
plainly as possible that the exclusion of
grand juries from the language of §
2518(10) (a) was deliberate:
"This provision [§ 2518(10) (a)]
must be read in connection with §§
2515 and 2517, discussed above, which
it limits. It provides the remedy for
the right created by § 2515. Because
no person is a party as such to a grand
jury proceeding, the provision does
nO.t envision the making of a motion
to suppress in the context of such a
proceeding itself. Normally, there · is
no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand
jury, which is enforceable by an individual. (Blue v. United States, 86
S.Ct. 1416, 384 U.S. 251 [16 L.Ed.2d
510] (1965).) There is no intent to.
change this general rule. It is ' the
intent of the provision only that when
the motion to suppress is granted in
anot her context, its scope may include
use in a future grand jury proceeding." (Emphasis added.) S.Rept.No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 106, U.S.
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2195.

There is an intimation in the opinion
of the Court that the reason this language was used may have been that grand
juries do not pass upon motions to suppress, while courts ' do. This intimation
is not only inconsistent with the language
of the section itself, as pointed out, ante,
p. 2364, but it attributes to the drafters
of the report a lower level of understanding of the subject matter with which they
were dealing than I believe is justified.
It is also rather squarely contradicted by
the statement that there is no limitation
on the character of evidence that may
be presented to a grand jury "which is
enforceable by an individual." Had the
report meant to stress th~ presumably
well-known fact that grand juries do not
themselves grant motions to suppress, it
would not have used that language, nor
would it have cited United States V.
Blue, supra.
The fact that the report states the
reason for the' policy adopted in terms
of the rights of an "individual," rather
than in terms of the rights of a "defendant," makes the Court's discussion of
the doctrine of various cases, ante, p.
, 2366 doubtful help in construing the statute. Whatever United States ,v. Blue,
supra, may be said to "hold" after careful
analysis by this Court, the drafters of the
Senate Report undoubtedly took it to
stand for the proposition for which they
cited it. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Green V. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 189, 78 S.Ct. 632,
646, 2 L.Ed.2d 672:
"The fact that scholarship has shown
that historical assumptions regarding
the procedure for punishment, of contempt of court were ill-founded, hardly wipes out a century and a half of
the legislative and judicial history
of federal law based on such assumptions."
Not only does the report dealing with
§ 2518(10) (a) make clear that it is to
be construed J n connection with § 2515,
which it limits, but the section of the
same report dealing with § 2515 re-em-
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phasizes this conclusion. Speaking of
the latter section, the report says:
"The provision must, of course, be
_read in light of § 2518(10) (a) discussed below, which defines the class
entitled to make a motion to suppress.
It largely reflects existing law .
Nor generally [is there any intention] to press the scope of the suppression rule beyond present search
and seizure law. See Walder v. United
States, 74 S.Ct. 354, 347 U.S. 62 [98
L.Ed. 503] (1954)
The
provision thus forms an integral part
of the system of limitations designed
to protect privacy. Along wit,h the
criminal and civil remedies, it should
serve to guarantee that the standards
of the new chapter will sharply curtail
the unlawful interception of wire and
oral communications."
The conclusion that § 2518(10 ) (a) is
the exclusive source of the right to
move to suppress is further fortified
by the Senate Report's comment on §
2510(11) of the Act, which defines an
"aggrieved person" as one who is a
party to an "interception of wire or oral
communication or a person against whom
the interception was directed." The Senate Report, page 91" U.S.Code Congo &
Admin.N ews, p. 2179, states:
"This definition defines the cla,s s' of
those who are entitled to invoke the
suppression sanction of section 2515
discussed below, through the motion
to suppress provided for by Section
2518 (10) (a), also discussed below.
It is intended to reflect existing law."
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Finally, § 2518(9) requires the Government to provide to each party to "any
trial, hearing . or other proceeding" a
copy of the court order authorizing surveillance if the Government intends to
use the fruits thereof. The Senate Report, p. 105, U.S.Code Congo & Admin.
News, p. 2195, states:
" 'Proceeding' is intended to include all
adversary type hearings

It would not include a grand jury

hearing. Compare Blue v. United
States (citation omitted)."
If § 2515 of the Omnibus Act of 1968
stood alone without any informative legislat ive history, the Court's conclusion
with respect to the rights of these petitioners would be plainly correct. If the
conflicting implications from two sections of the same statute were present
in a regulatory scheme which was to
stand by itself, rather than to be superimposed on procedures such as contempt
hearings and institutions such as. the
grand jury, the Court's conclusion would
at least be tenable. But when the
Court concludes that Congress, almost.
in a fit of absentmindedness, has drastically enlarged the right of potential grand
jury witnesses to avoid testifying, and
when such a conclusion is based upon
one of two ambivalent implications from
the language of the statute, and is contrary to virtually every whit of legislative history addressed to the point in
issue, I think its conclusion is plainly
wrong.

IV
The Court seeks to bolster its reasoning by reliance upon 18 U.S.C. § 3504
(a) (1), which was a part of the Organized Crime Act of 1970. That section
provides in pertinent part as follows:
"In any
before any

proceedipg entered
grand jury

"( 1) Upon a claim by a -party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of
an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim
shall affirm or deny the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful act."

Assuming, arguendo, that this section
does apply to these petitioners, the record in the District Court and the opinion
of the Court of Appeals clearly shows
that only Gelbard made what might be
called a "claim" within the language of
the section, and that the Government in
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its response did "affirm or deny" the
occurrence of the alleged unlawful act; ...
in fact, the Government denied the occurrence of the unlawful act. This
should be sufficient for disposition of
the case as to these petitioners.
The Court, without giving much guidance to those who would seek to follow
the path by which it reaches the conclusion, concludes that this section "confirms. that Congress meant that grand
ju!"y witnesses might defend contempt
charges by invoking the prohibition of
§ 2515 against the compelled disclosure
of evidence obtained in violation of Title
IlL" If the Court means to say any
more than that under the circumstances
specified in ·§ 3504, the Government must
affirm or deny, I am at a loss how ·it
extracts additional requirements from
the language used by Congress in that
section.
But even if the Court were correct
in deciding that § 3504(a) (1) requires
more than it says of the Government,
I believe the Court errs in deciding that
this section applies .at all to these petitioners. Section 3504 as enacteg actually consists of "two parts, A and B. Part
A is a series of findings by Congress,
reading as follows:
"The Congress finds that claims that
evidence offered in proceedings was
obtained by the exploitation of unlawful acts, and is therefore inadmissible
in evidence, (1) often cannot reliably
be determined when such claims concern evidence of events occurring
years after the allegedly unlawful act,
and (2) when the allegedly unlawful
act has occurred more than five years
prior to the event in question, there is
virtually no likelihood that the evidence offered to prove the event has
been obtained 'by the exploitation of
that all~gedly unlawful act."
House Report No. 91-1549 (to accompany S. 30) contains this comment
on Part A:
"This section contains a special finding relating, as do the foUowing sec-

tions of the title to certain evidentiary
problems' created by electronic surveillance conducted .by the Government
prior to the enactment of Public Law
90-351 on June 19, 1968;-which provided statutory authority for obtaining
surveillance warrants in certain types
of criminal investigations." (Emphasis
supplied.) 2 U.S.Code Congo & Admin.
News (91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970), at
p. 4026.
The same report, in its introductory discussion of Title VII, contains the following statement:
"Title VII intends to limit disclosure
of information illegally obtained by
the Government to defendants who
seek to challenge the admissibility of
evidence because it is either the primary or indirect production of such
an illegal act. The title also prohibits
any challenge to the admissibility of
evidence based on its being the fruit
of an unlawful governmental act, if
such act occurred 5 years or more before the events sought to be proved.
As amended by the committee, the application of title VII is limited to Federal judicial and administrative proceedings, and to electronic or mechanical surveillance . which occurred prior
to June 19, 1968, the date of enactment of the Federal wiretapping and
electronic surveillance law.' ~ (Chapter 119, Title XVIII, U.S.Code.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Senate Report, too, casts § 3504
(a) (1) in quite a different light from
that in which the Court puts it:
"Lastly, it should be noted that nothing in § 3504(a) (1) is intended to
codify or change present law defining
illegal conduct or prescribing requirements for standing to object to such
conduct or the use of evidence given
under an immunity grant. See, e. g.,
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S.
310 (1969); Alderman V. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 [89 S.Ct. 961,
22 L.Ed.2d 176] [89 S.Ct. 1163, 22
L.Ed.2d 297] (1969). Nevertheless,

since it requires a pending claim as
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a predicate to disclosure, it sets aside
the present wasteful practice of the
Department of Justice in searching
files without a motion from the defendant .
" (Emphasis supplied.)
These conclusions in the Senate Report are supported by statements of the
bill's managers in the House during fhe
time it was being debated. Congressman Poff explained Title VII as follows:
"Title VII would, first, reverse the
Supreme Court's decision in Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 [89
S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176] (1969) requiring, under its su'p ervisory power,
the disclosure of government files in
would,
criminal trials and
second, set a five-year statute of limitations on inserting issues dealing with
'fruit of the poisonous tree' in similar
cases." 116 Cong.Rec., 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 35192, Oct. 6, 1970. \.

'.

Congressman Celler explained the
amendments incorporating the June 18,
1968, time limitation into subsections
(a) (2) and (a) (3) of § 3504 that had
been made by a subcommittee of the '
House Judiciary Committee in these
.words:
"As amended by the committee, the
application of Title VII is limited to
federal judicial and administrative
proceedings, and to electronic surveillance which occurred prior to June
19, 1968, the date of enactment of
the Federal Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance law-Chapter 119,
Title XVIII, United States Code." [d.,
at 35196.
Even more specific was the explanation of the amendment made by Congressman Poff on the floor of the House
after the time provisions had been included:
"TITLE VII-LITIGATION CONCERNING SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
"Mr. Chairman, Title VII of the
Organized Crime Control Act is de-

signed to regulate motions to suppress
evidence in certain limited situations
where the motion is based upon unlawful electronic eavesdropping or
wiretapping which occurred prior to
the enactment of the Federal Electronic Surveillance laws on June 19, 1968 "Where there was in fact an unlawful overhearing prior to June - 19,
1968, the title provides for an in camera examination of the Government's
transcripts and records to determine
whether they may be relevant to the
claim of inadmissibility.
To
the extent that the court is permitted
to determine relevancy in an ex parte
proceeding, the title will modify the
procedure established by the Supreme
Court in Alderman v. United States
[citation omitted].

"As [ have indicated, the title applies only to disclosures where the
electronic surveillance occurr,ed / prior
to June 18, 1968. It is not necessary
that it apply to disclosure where an
electronic surveillance occurred after
that date, because such disclosu1'le will
be mandated not by Alderman, but by
section 2518 of Title 18, United States
Code, added by' 'l'itle III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968. Section 2518(10) (e)
[sic] provides a specific procedure for
motions to suppress the contents of
any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted, that the authorization for the interception was insufficient, or that the
interception was not made in conformity with the authorization obtained.
It provides, insofar as the disclosure
of intercepted communications is concerned, that upon the filing of a motion to suppress by an aggrieved person the trial judge may in his discretion make available to such person
and his counsel for inspection such
portions of an intercepted communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
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as the judge determines to be in the
interest of justice-see Senate Report
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106,

1968. The provisions of this title will,
therefore control the disclosure of
transcripts of electronic surveillances
conducted prior to June 19, 1968.
Thereafter, existing law; not Alderman
will control. Consequently, in view of
these amendments to Title VII, its enactment in conjunction with the provisions of Title III of the 1968 Act,
provides the Federal Government with
a comprehensive and integrated set
of procedural rules governing suppression litigation concerning electronic
surveillance." Id., at 35293-35294.

the language used by Congress in this
section, but illustrates the palpable error into which the Court has f{'lllen in
construing it. The Court has at least
figuratively stood on its head both the
language and the legislative history of
this section in order to conclude that it
was intended to expand the rights of
criminal defendants.
V

Neither the Omnibus Crime and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 nor the Organized
Crime Act of 1970, when construed in
accordance with the canons of statutory
construction traditionally followed by
this Court, support the expansive and
novel claims asserted by these petitioners. 'The Court having reached a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

(Emphasis added.)
The weight of the findings actually
enacted 'by Congress in Part A and the
uniform tenor of the legislative history
outweights, in my opinion, the ambiguity "arising from the failure to actually include a cutoff date in § 3504(a) (1).
Section 3504(a) (1) by its terms, even
if read totally out of their context and
background, as the Court seeks to do;
affords these petitioners no help because
the Government has complied with its
requirements in these cases. But more
importantly, the entire thrust of the
findings actu~lly adopted by Congress,
and of the reports of both Houses, make
it as plain as humanly possible that this
section was intended as a limitation on
existing rights of criminal defendants,
not as an enlargement of them. Congress, displeased with the effect of this
Court's decision in Alderman, supra, desired to put a statute of limitations type
cut-off beyond which the Government
would not be required to go in time in
order to disprove taint. Equally displeased with the policy adopted by the
Government ot searching its files for
evidence of taint even when none had
been alleged by the defendant, it sought
to put a stop to that practice by requiring the Government to "affirm or deny"
only where there is "a claim by a party
aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible."
Understanding of this background not
only affords a complete explanation of

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v.
Marian A. BYRUM, Executrix Under the
Last Will and Testament of Milliken
C.Byrwn.
No. 71-308.
Argued March 1, 1972.

Decide(! June 26, 1972.

Action by executrix of estate for refund of additional e ~ tate taxes paid by
reason of inclusion of trust res in value
of gross estate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, 311 F .Supp. 892, entered judgment
for the executrix, and the Government
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 440 F.
2d 949, affirmed, and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Powell, held that where settlor having controlling stock in closely held corporations transferred shares of such corporations to irrevocable trust while retaining the right to vote shares during

.1

